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B OO K R E V I EW S
Towards a Theory of Human Rights: Religion, Law, Courts
MICHAEL J PERRY
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, xiii þ 253 pp
(hardback £40.00) ISBN: 978-0-521-86551-7
In Cat’s Cradle, the novelist Kurt Vonnegut, observes:
Tiger got to hunt,
Bird got to fly;
Man got to sit and wonder ‘Why, why, why?’1
This undistinguished doggerel serves Vonnegut’s larger purpose, for it points
up humankind’s need to invest life with meaning. Dwelling on this need,
Vonnegut identifies it as finding expression in bodies of religious faith
that he regards as ‘nothing but lies’.2 Vonnegut thus traverses terrain that
Michael Perry also moves across in Towards a Theory of Human Rights. Perry
identifies the morality of human rights as giving expression to a quest for
meaning. Moreover, he sees this quest as being about more than the
impulse to wonder ‘Why?’ He argues that we cannot offer an adequate
account of the morality of human rights unless we see it as giving expression
to large ontological assumptions (which concern the nature of existence) rather
than lies.
Perry identifies ‘the morality of human rights’ as ‘the dominant morality of
our time’ (p 4). He also describes it as ‘global’ and thus unique in human
history. However, this morality is not ‘well understood’. This leads Perry to
concur with John Searle, who has argued that we lack ‘a clear theory of
human rights’. Perry also agrees with Searle on the point that the work
involved in elaborating such a theory is ‘just beginning’.3 Perry is, however,
clear on the question as to how the morality of human rights has gained the
currency that it now enjoys. Looking back on the ‘moral landscape’ of the
twentieth century, Perry finds it to be, in many respects, ‘bleak’ (p 4). The data
that he presents certainly support this conclusion: 109 million people died
in wars, while many more millions perished as a result of, inter alia,
slave labour and genocide. But Perry does not explain the ‘emergence . . .
1 K Vonnegut, Cat’s Cradle (London, 1965), p 115.
2 Ibid, p 139.
3 J Searle, ‘Social ontology and free speech’ (2004) 55 The Hedgehog Review 66.
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of the morality of human rights’ solely by reference to the carnage that unfolded
in the twentieth century. The significance now attached to human rights also
reflects what Pope John Paul II (in his encyclical Fides et Ratio) described as
‘the quest for meaning that has always compelled the human heart’. This
quest finds expression in the religious and non-religious grounds for human
rights examined by Perry.
Perry notes that both religious and non-religious accounts of the morality of
human rights give expression to a ‘twofold claim’ (p 5). These accounts point
up the ‘inherent dignity’ of each person; they also identify the inherent dignity
of human beings as having ‘normative force for us’. By this he means that
‘[w]e should live our lives in accordance with the fact that every human
being has inherent dignity’. Perry explains the religious ground for human
rights by reference to Jesus’ counsel to ‘love one another’; he takes this to
mean that we should see others as children of God and, therefore, as brothers
and sisters.
Perry identifies, inter alios, Ronald Dworkin and Martha Nussbaum as
offering non-religious grounds for the morality of human rights. Thus, we
find Dworkin appealing to the value that we attach to all human life,
while Nussbaum argues that we ‘care for others and feel disturbance
when bad things happen to them’.4 Perry responds to these arguments by
saying that their authors appeal to a consensus that, in each case, is a
‘phantom’ (p 23). Moreover, he identifies both Dworkin and Nussbaum as
having failed to take seriously Nietzsche’s argument that ‘morality’ cannot
survive where ‘the God who sanctions it is missing’. On this point, Perry
finds support in Phillipa Foot’s Natural Goodness, since she argued that
‘few contemporary moral philosophers . . . have really joined battle with
Nietzsche about morality’.5 Rather, they have ‘gone on taking moral judge-
ments for granted as if nothing had happened’ when Nietzsche declared
God to be dead.6
Perry does not focus exclusively on the grounds for human rights. He also
considers the role that the judiciary should play in protecting human rights
and examines three controversies in which the discourse of human rights
features prominently. These controversies concern abortion, same-sex
unions and capital punishment. In his examination of capital punishment,
Perry draws a contrast between the thinking of Pius XII on the one
hand and John Paul II on the other. Pius X-II argued that, ‘by his
crime’, a dangerous criminal has ‘already disposed himself of his right to
4 Perry quotes (p 24) from MC Nussbaum, ‘Compassion: the basic social emotion’, (1996) 13 Social
Philosophy and Policy 27.
5 P Foot, Natural Goodness (Oxford, 2001), p 103.
6 Ibid.
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live’.7 By contrast, John Paul II (in his 1995 encyclical, Evangelium Vitae) set
out what Perry calls an ‘unconditionalist principle’ (pp 41–46). This principle
specifies that all humans (including depraved criminals) have inherent
dignity. Moreover, it provides (on John Paul’s analysis) a ground on which
to conclude that execution is a violation of ‘the inalienable dignity of
human life’ (p 41).
While Perry accepts that every human being has inherent dignity, he does not
endorse the unconditionalist principle. He entertains the possibility that, in
some circumstances, there may be ‘a sufficiently weighty justification’ for
imposing the death penalty (p 47, et seq). Having staked out this and a variety
of other ‘conspicuously controversial’ conclusions (p 142), Perry draws his expo-
sition to a rather limp close, for he describes himself as doing no more than
making a contribution to a ‘conversation’ that is still unfolding. This is consist-
ent with the view that our efforts to theorise human rights are ‘just beginning’.
But a ‘conversation’ hardly holds out the prospect of strong protection for funda-
mental human interests.
Even if we entertain doubts about Perry’s conclusions, he certainly succeeds
in alerting us to a variety of grounds (religious and non-religious) for the mor-
ality of human rights. We should not suppose, however, that we will be able to
rest content with any of these grounds. Kurt Vonnegut provides a basis on which
to explain why uncertainties seem likely to gnaw away at us. He tells us that, for
humankind, the search for meaning is a ‘heartbreaking necessity’.8However, he
also identifies humans as afflicted by the impulse to unpick the webs of
meaning that invest their lives with significance.9 This seems to be as true in
the sphere of human rights as anywhere else. Perry’s emphasis on conversation
(a process that unfolds with no obvious stopping point) lends plausibility to this
conclusion.
RICHARD MULLENDER
Newcastle Law School
doi:10.1017/S0956618X0800149X
7 Perry quotes (p 40) from EC Brugger, Capital Punishment and Roman Catholic Moral Tradition (Notre
Dame, IN, 2003) p 26, emphasis in original.
8 Vonnegut, Cat’s Cradle, p 177.
9 Vonnegut’s assessment of humankind bears similarities to that in a novel that he greatly admired.
See F Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov (London, 1992), pp 292–294, where the dying Elder
Zosima notes that, while people ‘thirst’ for meaning (in the form of ‘the word of God’), they are
apt to be ‘scoffers and blasphemers’. See also K Vonnegut, Slaughterhouse Five or The Children’s
Crusade: a duty to dance with death (London, 1970), p 73, where Eliot Rosewater observes that ‘every-
thing there is to know about life is in The Brothers Karamazov . . . [b]ut that isn’t enough any more’
(emphasis in original).
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